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CASE NOTES
CONCLUSION
In Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, the facts that the
state of Wisconsin gave the Electric Company a great deal of assistance
and support; that its motive in doing so was to enable the Company
to perform what may be classified as a public function; that the Com-
pany did in fact perform a function vital to the community; that the
state exercised great control over the Company's activities; and that
the state specifically permitted the Company to terminate electric
service for nonpayment of a disputed bill, when taken together, show
"significant involvement" of the state in the affairs of the Company,
make the state a "joint participant" in the Company's termination of
the plaintiff's electric service, and thereby turn the Company's "pri-
vate" action in discontinuing service into state action. In many states
other than Wisconsin, these same factors can be found in the relation-
ship between the state and its utilities. Accordingly, it is submitted
that whenever a problem arises in any of these jurisdictions concerning
termination of a vital service by a utility, the utility's action should be
considered state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Further-
more, since a service such as electricity is a vital service in all parts
of the country, in all states due process should require that a prior
impartial hearing be given before service is actually discontinued.
WILLIAM J. TUCKER
Uniform Commercial Code—Sections 1-201(19), 2-103(1) (b), 9-
307(1 )—Cood Faith Requirement for Buyer in Ordinary Course-
Sherrock Brothers v. Commercial Credit Corporation.1—Plaintiff
Sherrock Brothers, an automobile dealer, purchased two new auto-
mobiles from Dover Motors, another dealer, which had a floor plan
financing agreement for its vehicles with defendant, Commercial Credit
Corporation. Pursuant to the sales agreement, plaintiff made payment
to Dover but allowed Dover to retain possession of the two automobiles
for several days in order that Dover might use these vehicles for dis-
play purposes. Dover agreed that it would then deliver the vehicles to
Sherrock Brothers. Before Dover delivered the cars, however, Com-
mercial discovered that Dover had been selling cars "out of trust." 2
Therefore, citing a provision in its security agreement with Dover
its members, has no interest in the outcome of the dispute, and hence could be relied on
to conduct a fair hearing and render an impartial decision.
The question of precisely what elements of a fair hearing are necessary in order to
satisfy due process requirements is open to some dispute. However, a consideration of
these elements is beyond the scope of the present article.
1 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972).
2 The term "out of trust" refers to the practice whereby a debtor under a secured
transaction sells the goods subject to the security agreement to a third party and does
not satisfy his financial obligation to his creditor. Sherrock Brothers v, Commercial
Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708, 709 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
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which prohibited the car dealer from selling any cars without its per-
mission, the defendant repossessed Dover's entire stock of automobile
inventory, including the two cars that Sherrock Brothers had pur-
chased. Consequently plaintiff instituted an action for the wrongful
possession of the two automobiles by Commercial, the secured party.
At trial, the Delaware Superior Court held that Sherrock Brothers
was not entitled to the two vehicles since it did not fall under the
protective aegis of Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Coded
Under this section, if a party is able to establish himself as a "buyer in
ordinary course of business," he is entitled to take the goods free of
any security interest created in them by his seller, and the secured
party must look to his debtor for his remedy. In order to qualify as
a "buyer in ordinary course," the purchaser must act in "good faith."
The trial court reasoned that because the plaintiff was a merchant-
buyer, it must satisfy not only the "good faith" requirement of Article
I but also the more stringent Article 2 "good faith" requirement of
3 Id. at 713. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of section 1-201) other
than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming opera-
tions takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
All cites to the Uniform Commercial Code will be to the 1962 Official Text, hereinafter
cited as U.C.C., unless otherwise indicated. (Delaware has not yet officially adopted the
1972 Official Text.) For the purposes of this note, Delaware's adoption of the Code ac-
curately follows the official text. The term "buyer in ordinary course of business" is
defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(9) as follows:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights
or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from
a person in the business of selling goods of that kind „ . .
These two sections taken together are interpreted in the Official Comments to § 9-307
as follows:
The buyer takes free (of a security interest) if he merely knows that there is a
security interest which covers the goods, but takes subject if he knows, in
addition, that the sale is in violation of some term in the security agree-
ment .. 
U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2.
Section 9-307 is intended to facilitate the free movement of goods by establishing a
rule of priority between a secured party and a "buyer in ordinary course of business"
when a conflict arises after an unauthorized sale of secured collateral by a debtor. Note,
9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 985, 990-91 (1968). It is also "designed to prevent the
inventory lender from • . claiming on the one hand, that his security interest has
priority over the good faith buyer, and, on the other band, allowing the financier to
clothe the dealer with apparent authority to sell without obvious restraint." Murray,
Security Interests in Inventory Priorities and Problems, 25 Ti. Miami L. Rev. 634, 651
(1971).
Typically, in floor plan financing situations, the secured party expects his debtor to
sell the goods before the debt is paid since this method is the only way that the debtor
can raise the cash necessary to pay the debt. Thus, a buyer in ordinary course can pur-
chase goods which are the collateral to a security agreement and still maintain a position
of priority vis-i-vis the secured party.
4 U.C.C. § 1-201(9), quoted in pertinent part in note 3 supra.
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observance of "reasonable commercial standards"' in order to qualify
as a "buyer in the ordinary course of business."' In short, the plaintiff's
status as a merchant was grounds for applying the latter standard. The
trial court found that Sherrock Brothers had not observed "reasonable
commercial standards," and that therefore it had not satisfied the
Article 2 test of "good faith." 7 Accordingly, the court held, Sherrock
Brothers did not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course and there-
fore could not be protected by section 9-307(1).
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether Sherrock Brothers, a merchant-buyer, had to fulfill the "good
faith" requirements of both Articles 1 and 2 in order to become a
buyer in ordinary course and thus qualify for protection under sec-
tion 9-307(1). The court, noting that the litigation was between a
buyer and a secured creditor rather than a buyer and a seller, HELD:
in order to qualify for the protection offered by section 9-307(1) to a
"buyer in ordinary course of business," a merchant who purchases
from a debtor who is a party to a secured transaction must satisfy only
the section 1-201(19) requirement of "honesty in fact." 8 The court
reasoned that the more rigorous Article 2 definition of "good faith" is
limited to the sales transactions that are the subject of that Article,
and that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant
depended not upon a sale between them but rather upon what was in
essence an Article 9 secured transaction; hence plaintiff's "good faith"
must be tested only by the Article 1 definition of "good faith," which
is generally applicable to all sections of the Code.
This decision represents an attempt by the highest court of
Delaware to correct the apparent lack of guidelines in the Code regard-
ing the "good faith" requirements that a merchant seeking classifica-
tion as a buyer in ordinary course must satisfy in a controversy
involving both a sale and a secured transaction.° This note will examine
the Sherrock holding and rationale. It will then consider the pre-Code
development of two definitions of "good faith" in commercial trans-
actions—subjective and objective—and the incorporation of these defi-
nitions into the Code. The history of Section 1-102 of the Code will
then be considered in order to determine the degree of "flexibility"
5
 The Article 1 definition of "good faith" provides: "Good faith means honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. # 1-201(19). The Article 2 defini-
tion provides: "(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires . . . (b)
`Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. 2-103(1)(b).
8 277 A.2d at 710-11. It is settled that a merchant-buyer may qualify as a "buyer
in the ordinary course of business." See Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 36 App. Div,
2d 6, 9, 317 N.Y.S.2d 542, 545 (1971); Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet,
Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1970).
7
 277 A.2d at 713.
8
 290 A.2d at 650-51.
9 Eisenberg, Goad Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code—A New Look at an
Old Problem, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1971).
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afforded to expressly limited definitions in the Code. It will be sub-
mitted that, while the Sherrock holding is a proper interpretation of
the Uniform Commercial Code, that case should not be followed in
all cases involving secured transactions. Rather, it will be submitted,
section 1-102 permits a limited degree of flexibility in applying the
Article 2 requirement: Specifically, it allows a court to impose that
stricter standard of "good faith" on merchants in a secured transaction
case if that secured transaction arose out of a sale transaction to which
both litigants were parties.
The She rrock Rationale
In arriving at its holding in Sherrock, the Delaware Supreme
Court relied upon the fact that since Sherrock Brothers and Com-
mercial had not been parties to a sale between themselves, the con-
troversy between the litigants arose solely out of a secured transaction;
hence it should be governed by Article 9, not Article 2. Therefore, in
deciding whether Sherrock Brothers had acted in "good faith" and
thereby qualified as a "buyer in ordinary course of business," the
court reasoned that Sherrock Brothers should be held only to the Arti-
cle 1 standard of "honesty in fact." The Article 2 definition is ap-
plicable only in controversies arising out of a sale between the litigants.
The court noted several reasons for this conclusion:" first, Article 9
of the Code contains a provision which explicitly refers to Article 1 for
definitions11 but contains no similar reference to Article 2 for any defi-
nitions; second, section 9-307(1) expressly refers to section 1-201(9)
for the definition of buyer in the ordinary course;" third, the Defini-
tional Cross References to section 9-307 refer to specific sections of
Article 1 for definitions, but there is no similar reference to Article
2;" and finally, the definitions contained in Article 2 are expressly
limited to that Article." Applying the Article 1 standard of "honesty
in fact," the court found that Sherrock Brothers had met that test and
was therefore entitled to protection under section 9-307(1); even
though the lower court had found that Sherrock Brothers had been
commercially imprudent, such a finding did not affect its qualification
under Article 1."
The appellate court in Sherrock, then, relied upon the nature of
the transaction between the litigants. The major significance of the
decision is the holding that when there is a controversy between
merchants over priority rights in goods which were not subject to a
sale between the litigants—even though a sale between a litigant and
10 290 A.2d at 651.
11 U.C.C. § 9-105(4) provides: "In addition Article 1 contains general definitions
and principles of construction and interpretation applicable throughout this Article."
12 The text of § 9-307(1) is set out in note 3 supra.
15 U.C.C. § 9-307, Definitional Cross References.
14 U.C.C. § 2-103(1).
15 290 A.2d at 650.
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a third party is involved in the facts which give rise to the litigation—
then Article 2 definitions should not be applied in the determination
of the parties' rights. Also significant was the court's refusal to accept
the lower court's test, which focused not upon the nature of the trans-
action but upon the status of the parties as merchants and found in
that status justification for imposing the Article 2 requirement. It
may be noted at this point that the same focus is evident in the ap-
pellate dissent, which, as will be discussed below, argued that on policy
grounds merchants should be held to the Article 2 standard even in a
secured transaction.
It will be submitted that the court's holding was legally sound,
but that its rationale would have been more effective had it utilized
the history of the term "good faith" as it was developed in pre-Code
case law and a statutory interpretation of the use of the term "good
faith" in the Code." Both factors, it is argued below, significantly
strengthen the court's decision to look to the nature of the transaction
between the parties. They reveal no grounds for extending the Article
2 requirement to all merchants, strong as the policy reasons for such
an extension may be.
It will also be submitted, however, that Sherrock should not be
followed indiscriminately. Although it may be true that the Article 2
test cannot be used if there was no sale between the parties to the liti-
gation, it does not follow that it may not be used in any case where the
cause of action is a secured transaction. Rather, there are grounds for
arguing that section 1-102 permits such use if the secured transaction
in question was part of a sales transaction between the parties.
Definitions of "Good Faith"
"Good faith" has historically been defined either subjectively or
objectively. The subjective definition of "good faith" as "honesty in
fact"—which is sometimes referred to as "the rule of the pure heart
16
 It is also submitted that the court's use of precedent was weak. For example, the
court cited Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.
1970), as authority for the Sherrock decision. Associates involved a similar situation of
a dealer selling automobiles to another dealer "out of trust" in violation of a security
agreement. However, the Texas court concluded solely that a merchant-dealer can enjoy
the status of a "buyer in ordinary course of business." That court did not reach the
central question of the Sherrock case which concerned the good faith requirements that
a merchant-buyer must satisfy when involved in a dispute with a secured party over
goods sold to the buyer by the secured party's debtor.
The Sherrock court also dismissed without comment the contrary decision reached
in 1971 by the New York Appellate Division in Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 36
App. Div. 2d 6, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 542 (1971), which involved a fact situation similar to
that in Sherrock. The New York court held that a merchant-buyer must satisfy both
"good faith" tests in order to qualify for the protection afforded by § 9-307(1). How-
ever, the Castle Ford court did not base its decision upon any case law or analysis of
the statutory history of the Code; rather, it merely assumed that both standards of
"good faith" should be applied regardless of the type of transaction in dispute.
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and the empty head""--dates back in the law of negotiable instru-
ments to the 1836 case of Goodman v. Harvey.18 The primary con-
cern under the subjective theory of "good faith" is whether "the
particular purchaser believed he was in good faith, not whether any-
one else would have held the same belief."" The test to determine
whether one is acting in "good faith" under this standard is what the
particular person did or thought in the given situation and whether
or not he was honest in what he did. Under this theory, a purchaser of
goods must have actual knowledge of some other person's interest in
the goods in order to be found lacking in "good faith": "Mere suspi-
cion is not enough. Gross negligence is insufficient. Mere failure to
inquire is not enough to impeach his title, although he must not shut
his eyes to the means of knowledge which he knows are at hand." 2°
The only instances in which the subjective test of "honesty in
fact" rules that conduct has not been in "good faith" are when the
"purchaser . . . feigns ignorance of third party rights . . . , pretends
belief in their absence or willfully refrains from investigating"" facts
which would inform him of third party rights. 22 Actual knowledge of
third party rights, or a deliberate attempt not to ascertain this knowl-
edge, is required for one not to be "honest in fact." Therefore, if the
"purchaser . negligently fails to ascertain the existence of third party
rights,"23 he has not violated the subjective "good faith" requirement."
Thus, what is most important under the subjective theory of "good
faith" is the state of mind of the purchaser and his degree of innocence
and/or ignorance.
The objective theory of "good faith" originated in 1824 in the
case of Gill v. Cubitt." According to this test, the trier of fact must
determine what an ordinarily prudent man would have done or thought
under the same circumstances. One's actual state of mind is no longer
the critical factor; one's innocence, suspicion or actual notice is no
17 Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 798, 812 (1958).
18 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836). This case held that in an action by the indorsee of a
bill who has given value, whose title is disputed on the ground that his indorser obtained
the discount of the bill in fraud of the rightful owner, the question for the jury is
whether the indorsee acted in good faith in taking the bill; and that one is acting in
good faith even if he takes the bill under circumstances which might reasonably have
awakened one's suspicion.
19 Note, .51 Va. L. Rev. 1342, 1357 (1965).
2D Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Sub-
jective Test, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 48, 53 (1966).
21 Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 210 (1968).
22 Id. at 210-11,
28 Id. at 210.
24 Id.
28 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824). This case held that in an action on a bill of exchange
by the broker against the acceptor, the jury was properly directed to find a verdict for
the defendant if they found that the plaintiff had taken the bill under circumstances
which ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent and careful man.
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longer relevant. Instead, the inquiry goes to the prevailing community
standards as to what is decent, fair or reasonable." The conduct in
question is judged according to the prevailing customs, usages and
practices of the particular business involved. Consequently, the party
seeking to prove his own "good faith" under the objective test must
not only demonstrate a lack of actual knowledge but must also show
that he made the efforts which an ordinarily prudent businessman
would have made in order to determine if any third party rights did
exist. Even a negligent failure to ascertain third party rights could be
a violation of the objective standard if the prevailing customs and
practices in the trade would require a prudent businessman to ascertain
these rights under the circumstances."
The objective standard of "good faith" thus imposes a more
stringent requirement on one who claims to be a "buyer in ordinary
course of business" than does the subjective standard, since a good
faith purchase is requisite to classification as a buyer in ordinary
course. The subjective standard requires only that the buyer be
unaware of any conflicting claims in the goods involved in the trans-
action. The objective test, on the other hand, demands not only that
the actual purchaser be unaware of any third party rights to the goods,
but also that an ordinarily prudent businessman would have remained
similarly unaware of these third party rights.
"Good Faith" in the Uniform Commercial Code
The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code recognized these
two different "good faith" tests and incorporated both into the Code.
In the 1950 proposed draft of the Code, there was one general "good
faith" definition, which was contained in Section 1-201:
"Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or trans-
action concerned. Good faith includes observance by a per-
son of the reasonable commercial standards of any business
or trade in which he is engaged."
This Article 1 definition thus included the terminologies of both the
subjective and objective theories of good faith. In effect, this defini-
tion would have required a merchant to behave in a commercially rea-
sonable manner in any transaction governed by the Code.
In the 1952 final official draft of the Code, the objective standard
was deleted from the Article 1 definition of "good faith"" and was
20
 Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666, 668 (1963).
27 Summers, supra note 21, at 210-11.
28 U.C.C. § 1-201(18) (1950 Proposed Draft).
29 Waiter D. Malcolm, one of the drafters of the Code, has noted that the Com-
mittee on the Proposed Commercial Code of the Section on Corporation Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association recommended that the 1950 definition of
good faith in Article 1 be changed so that "reasonable commercial standards" be deleted
from the definition. The committee gave three reasons for its recommendation:
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inserted in certain provisions in Article 2 and Article 7. 80 On the basis
of this change, it may be concluded that the draftsmen intended that
the subjective definition of good faith was to apply generally—to all
transactions covered by the Code—while the objective definition was
to be used only when a particular provision of the Code called
for its application. One such provision in the 1952 draft was section
2-103(1) (b), which stated that a merchant involved in a sales trans-
action covered by Article 2 must observe "reasonable commercial
standards" as well as be "honest in fact." This section has not been
changed in subsequent drafts and is identical to the present section
2-103 (1) (b).
Another change made in the 1950 proposed draft of the Code
appears to offer further support for the theory that the subjective
definition of "good faith" is to be applied throughout the Code while
the objective definition is to be used only when a specific provision,
such as Section 2-103(1) (b), expressly calls for its application. In the
1950 draft, section 1-102(3) read as follows:
A provision of this Act which is stated to be applicable
"between merchants" or otherwise to be of limited application
need not be so limited when the circumstances and underlying
reasons justify extending its application. 81
If this section had been retained in the Code, it could be argued that
the Article 2 definition of "good faith" could be applied to a merchant
regardless of the type of transaction in dispute; in other words, the
section could be interpreted to support a status test. This argument is
based upon the theory that the language in the 1950 proposed version
of section 1-102 (3) could be interpreted as allowing the Article 2
definition of "good faith," despite the explicit statement limiting its
use to that Article, to be applied in appropriate situations to a merchant
even when the transaction in dispute is not covered by Article 2. How-
ever, this section was deleted from the Code, and the present Section
1-102 was adopted in its place.
The present version of section 1-102 provides in part:
(1) To the average person and the average lawyer, "good faith" signifies pri-
marily "honesty";
(2) The phrase "observance of reasonable commercial standards" carries with it
the implication of usages, customs and practices. It would be very difficult to
determine what usages, customs or practices are included in the standard; and
(3) There is the serious possibility that customs and practices could be frozen
into particular molds, thereby destroying the flexibility absolutely essential to
the gradual evolution of commerdal practices.
Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. Law. 113, 128 (1951).
so U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 7-404. The text of § 2-103(1) (b) is set out in note 5
supra. U.C.C. § 7-404 exempts from liability a "bailee who in good faith including
observance of reasonable commercial standards has received goods and delivered or other-
wise disposed of them according to the terms of the documents of title" or pursuant to
Article 7.
81 U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1950 Proposed Draft) (emphasis added).
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(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions."
Although this section allows for the liberal construction of the Code,
it does not appear to have the same effect as the 1950 proposed ver-
sion with regard to encouraging the extension to other Articles or
sections of the Code provisions which ostensibly are applicable only to
a specified section or Article. However, it does permit a limited de-
gree of flexibility, one which may be exercised in conjunction with
a nature-of-the-transaction test such as the Sherrock court used.
For example, it is submitted that the present section 1-102 would
permit the Article 2 definition of "good faith" to be utilized in an
Article 9 secured transaction situation wherein a merchant-seller de-
livers to a merchant-buyer a quantity of goods and the seller retains
a security interest in the goods to insure payment at a later date."
Since this situation has a sales aspect to it and both merchants are
parties to the sale, Article 2 applies and both parties should be held
to the "reasonable commercial standards" definition of "good faith"
when dealing with each other. If the seller-secured party should in-
stitute an action either for the price under the sales agreement" or
for the goods under the security agreement," it arguably should make
82 U.C.C. § 1-102.
all A "good faith" issue can arise in several instances in this two-party situation
whereby the seller also retains a security interest in the goods involved in the sale. For
example, "good faith" could become an issue in an instance where the agent of the
seller-secured party, aware that his debtor had defaulted on currently due loan pay-
ments, gives assurances to the debtor that additional capital financing will be forth-
coming, tells the debtor to use his available funds to pay his general obligations (and,
thus, not pay the loan payments then due) and then the seller-secured party, without
notice, exercises his security rights to seize the delinquent debtor's entire stock in trade.
The Third Circuit was faced with this fact situation in Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964). The court held the secured party to a "good faith"
standard, citing the requirement of section 1-203 that "[elvery contract within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in Its performance or enforcement." Id. at 851. The
court, however, did not reach the issue of which "good faith" standard was to apply,
finding implicitly that the defendant's actions were so blatantly in bad faith as to have
violated both standards.
84
 U.C.C. 1} 2-709 allows a seller to recover the price of goods accepted by the
buyer when the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due.
85 U.C.C. § 9-503 gives a secured party the right to take possession of the secured
goods upon the default of his debtor. Although this "self-help" provision of the Code
does not require the secured party to go to court for a judgment against the debtor, the
constitutionality of this procedure is now in doubt. See Adams v. Egley, 388 F. Supp.
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no difference whether the seller-secured party's cause of action is
based upon the sales contract or the security agreement, since both
causes of action evolved out of the same transaction and are there-
fore intertwined with each other. Therefore, both transactions should
be governed by the same legal principles and definitions.
On the basis of this reasoning, it is submitted that even if the
secured party should bring suit against his debtor on the security
agreement alone, the Article 2 "reasonable commercial standards" defi-
nition test, as well as its requirement of "honesty in fact," should be
applied to both parties. Since the essence of the transaction between
the parties was a sale, both should be held accountable to the more
rigorous standard throughout the rest of their transaction. This two-
party sale-secured transaction is one instance wherein it appears that
the present Section 1-102 of the Code would permit an Article 2 defi-
nition to be applied in a dispute based in part on the secured party's
security interest in the goods which be had sold to his debtor.
It is submitted, however, that the deletion of the former version
of section 1-102 precludes the extension of the Article 2 definition of
"good faith" to a situation like that in Sherrock, where the interest
of the seller-secured party conflicts with the interest of a merchant
who purchased goods from the secured party's debtor. In this three-
party situation, the conflict is between two parties who are not in
a seller-buyer relationship. The dispute involves only the determina-
tion of priority rights to goods subject to a security agreement. On
the other hand, the former version of section 1-102 (3) could have
been interpreted to permit an Article 2 definition to be applied to
such a three-party conflict. As has been suggested, that version seemed
to sanction the application of a definition which was expressly limited
to merchants involved in sales transactions to different types of trans-
actions covered by other articles and provisions in the Code when
"circumstances justify extending its application."" It appears that
the deleted section would have permitted the utilization of the ob-
jective theory of "good faith" whenever a merchant was involved in
any type of transaction that was governed by the Code: in short, it
could have justified broad application of a status test such as that
exercised by the lower court in Sherrock.
The deletion of former Section 1-102 (3) from the Code thus
further underscores the unadvisability of applying the Article 2 defi-
nition of "good faith" to a dispute between merchants who were not
parties to a sales transaction between themselves. If that section had
been retained, it could be maintained that regardless of the type of
transaction involved, a merchant's "good faith" must be judged ac-
cording to the objective theory. With the deletion of that section,
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). Hence, secured parties may be required to litigate the issues of
good faith in the sales agreement and the security agreement.
30 U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1950 Proposed Draft). This section is set out in the text at
note 31 supra.
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however, it appears that the determination of which definition of
"good faith" to apply should be based upon the nature of the trans-
action between the parties involved in the dispute. The present lan-
guage of the Code should not be interpreted as permitting the Article
2 "good faith" definition to be applied in a controversy between par-
ties who were not involved in a sales transaction between themselves.
The Sherrock Holding
On the basis of this analysis of the term "good faith" and its
history under the Code, it appears that the Delaware Supreme Court
reached a correct decision in the Sherrock case. The court held that
Sherrock Brothers was to be judged solely according to the subjec-
tive, or Article 1, test of "good faith" in determining whether it was
a "buyer in ordinary course of business." Since the trial court had
found that Sherrock Brothers was "honest in fact,"" it qualified as
a "buyer in ordinary course of business" and was entitled to the
protection offered by section 9-307(1). There was no need to apply
the objective, or Article 2, definition of "good faith" since the two
parties, Sherrock Brothers and Commercial Credit, were not parties
to a sales transaction between themselves, and the conflict arose solely
because Commercial retained a security interest in the vehicles.
The dissent in Sherrock rejected the majority's analysis of the
problem in terms of the transaction and relationship between the
litigants and instead adopted a more policy-oriented approach based
on the fact that Sherrock Brothers, the party whose "good faith" was
in question, was a merchant." The dissent argued that for a merchant
to be accorded the status of a "buyer in ordinary course of business,"
the merchant must observe "reasonable commercial standards" as
well as be "honest in fact" in any transaction in which he is in-
volved." Thus, according to the dissent, because Sherrock Brothers
was a merchant, the Article 2 objective definition of "good faith"
should have been applied to the dispute. However, although this argu-
ment may be commercially reasonable and advisable, it is not sup-
ported by the explicit language of the Code." The definition of "buyer
in ordinary course" contains no reference to the objective standard
of "good faith,"4 ' and there is no statement in Article 2 that the
definitions contained therein apply to other Articles of the Code. Fur-
thermore, the preceding historical treatment of the subjective and
objective definitions of "good faith" and their adoption as separate
definitions by the drafters of the Code' rebuts the policy justification
for the dissenting opinion. Therefore, the objective definition of "good
37 277 A.2d at 708-09.
88 290 A.2d at 651-52 (dissenting opinion).
38 Id.
40
 For a full development of this point, see text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
41 The term "buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined in { 1-201(9), which
is quoted in pertinent part in note 3 supra.
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faith" should not be applied to a merchant merely because he is a
merchant but should be applied only to a merchant who is involved
in a sales transaction, and therefore subject to the provisions of Ar-
ticle 2.
Although the majority in Sherrock apparently reached a correct
conclusion, it is submitted that the Sherrock holding should be strictly
construed. It should not be interpreted as precluding absolutely the
application of the Article 2 definition of "good faith" to any case
involving a secured transaction since it is arguable that in a two-party
sale-secured transaction between merchants, the parties should still
be governed by any definition which applies to merchants involved
in a sales transaction even though there is also a secured transaction
involved. On the basis of this theory, it appears that the Sherrock
decision should control only where there is a similar three-party situa-
tion giving rise to a controversy between a merchant-buyer and a
secured party over priority rights to goods which were sold "out of
trust" to the merchant-buyer.
Conclusion
"Good faith" is a highly amorphous term. One commentator has
suggested that the term should not be given a meaning of its own but
should rather be defined negatively in terms of what it is not.
["Good faith"] is a phrase without general meaning (or
meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a wide range of
heterogeneous forms of bad faith. In a particular context the
phrase takes on specific meaning, but usually this is only by
way of contrast with the specific form of bad faith actually
or hypothetically ruled out.42
The Code draftsmen have, however, attempted to give specific
meaning to the term by defining "good faith" to mean "honesty in
fact"4a and also, in certain situations, the "observance of reasonable
commercial standards.' The draftsmen neglected, however, to pro-
vide standards to assist in the proper application of these two "good
faith" definitions. The 1950 proposed draft demonstrates an intent
by the draftsmen to have the objective standard of "good faith" ap-
plied to a merchant whenever he is involved in a commercial trans-
action, whether it be a sale or any other transaction. However, the
1952 final official draft evidences a contrary intent whereby the ob-
jective definition is to be utilized only when a specific section of the
Code calls for its application. The present Code, which follows the
1952 draft, therefore requires that the objective standard be applied
42 Summers, supra note 21, at 200-01.
48 U.C.C.	 1-201(19).
44 U.C.C.	 2-103(1)(b).
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only when a party is involved in a sales transaction and does not
call for the application of the objective standard in a dispute between
two merchants not parties to a sales transaction between themselves.
LEONARD S. VOLIN
Labor Law—Authority of National Labor Relations Board—Con-
solidation of Existing Bargaining Units through Unit Clarification
Proceedings—United Glass & Ceramic Workers v. NLRB. 1—The
United Glass and Ceramic Workers and various locals thereof (Union)
brought suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit to challenge a decision by the National Labor Relations Board'
which dismissed an unfair labor practice complaint filed against
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. The Company maintained ten plants at various
locations throughout the country, eight of which composed a single
multiplant unit; in this unit the Union was certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative. Each of the two remaining units was orga-
nized as a separate bargaining unit by the Union, and the Union en-
joyed voluntary recognition in the two single-plant units.' In 1968,
after the Company had refused during collective bargaining with the
multiplant unit to consent to Union requests for consolidation of all
three units, the Union petitioned the Board for a unit clarification to
merge the three units into a single multiplant unit. The full Board de-
cided, with Members Fanning and Jenkins dissenting, that the unit
clarification proceeding may be used to consolidate existing bargaining
units, and ordered a self-determination election in each single-plant unit
to ascertain the wishes of the employees. 4 In the elections, a majority
in each plant preferred consolidation with the multiplant unit, and the
NLRB, subsequent to the elections, ordered the consolidation of the
three units .5 The Company acceded to the merger of one of the single-
plant units with the multiplant unit, but, for a number of reasons,'
1 463 F.2d 31, 80 L.R.R.M. 2882 (3d Cir. 1972).
2
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1806 (1971).
3 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. McCulloch, 67 L.R.R.M 2712, 2714 (D.D.C.
1968). In this case the district court enjoined the Board from conducting the self-
determination election hereinafter discussed. On appeal the injunction was dissolved. The
dissolution was based upon a lack of jurisdiction in the district court to enter the in-
junction. McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916, 68 L.R.R.M. 2447
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
4
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126, 67 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1968). The
use of the unit clarification for this purpose was a marked departure from traditional
Board usages. See text at notes 13-22 infra.
The official report of the Board indicates a majority consisting of Chairman McCul-
loch and Members Fanning and Zagoria, with Members Fanning and Jenkins concurring
in part and dissenting In part. It seems apparent that Member Brown, not Member Fan-
ning, was a member of the majority, and that there was a misprint in the official re-
port.
5
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1231, 69 L.R.R.M. 1558 (1968).
6 Brief for Intervenor at 31-33, United Glass & Ceramic Workers v. NLRB, 463
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